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INTRODUCTION

In December 2014, an anonymous source reported possible signs of
abuse on four-year-old I.B.’s body, including bruised knees and small
cuts.1 This prompted an investigation by the Department of Human
Services through caseworker April Woodard.2 Despite only being aware
of bruised knees and small cuts on I.B.’s stomach, Woodard fully
undressed and photographed I.B.’s private areas without obtaining a
warrant or parental consent.3 I.B.’s parents sued, claiming this was an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.4 However, I.B. and
her family lost this lawsuit and never recovered because the law was
unclear about whether a warrant was required or whether the special
needs doctrine applied.5 This uncertainty shielded Woodard from liability
under qualified immunity.6
To protect children like I.B. from an invasion of privacy through
searches like this, the law needs to clearly define when a warrant is
required to conduct a strip search of suspected victims of child abuse.
This Comment focuses on the special needs doctrine, one of the
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and the
circuit split over its application. The Tenth Circuit should follow the
growing trend in the circuit split to block the special needs doctrine from
applying to searches of suspected victims of child abuse for three
reasons: (1) the tests used to determine if the special needs doctrine
applies are ambiguous and unclear, creating uncertainty in the law; (2)
the potential consequences resulting from warrantless searches are
severe, so all due process should be afforded; and (3) the special needs
doctrine could be abused.
Doe v. Woodard is a significant case because it emphasizes the
growing circuit split and the uncertainty social workers face when
deciding whether to obtain a warrant.7 The Tenth Circuit recognized this
uncertainty in the law and correctly determined that the law was not
“clearly established.”8 When the law is not clearly defined, government
employees will not be held liable for actions they did not realize were

1

Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id.
3
Id. at 1285–86.
4
Id. at 1286.
5
Id. at 1288 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Fourth Amendment
claims for failing to show that a warrant was clearly required).
6
Id. at 1289–90.
7
Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019).
8
Id. at 1294.
2
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unlawful.9 Therefore, victims of invasive searches, like I.B., cannot
recover.
Woodard’s conduct was not an isolated event, but rather,
unwarranted bodily inspections of children are taking place every day.
With millions of searches taking place, social workers need to be able to
conduct their business knowing whether they are required to obtain a
warrant. In 2017, child protection agencies in the U.S. received 2.4
million reports of alleged child abuse.10 However, of those 2.4 million
reports, 1.8 million were screened out as unfounded cases.11 When
narrowing the focus to one state, Kansas, reports show Child Protective
Services receives over two-hundred reports a day, with sixty-three
percent meeting the criteria to warrant an investigation.12 As of March
2018, abuse investigators in Kansas were working on twenty-one to
twenty-six cases at a time, despite the Child Welfare League of
America’s recommendation that caseworkers should maintain no more
than twelve cases at a time.13
With hefty caseloads, defining whether the search of a child’s body
is a “special need,” which does not require obtaining a warrant, is a
pivotal question needing a timely response. However, policy and
procedure manuals for caseworkers are often lengthy and dense, making
it difficult for caseworkers to know proper search boundaries.14 For
example, 91.1% of child abuse allegations in Kansas were found to be
unsubstantiated after an investigation.15 This means that even if 91.1% of
9

Id. at 1289.
U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Serv’s., CHILD MALTREATMENT 6-10 (2017),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/cm2017.pdf.
11
Id. at 6-7 (“Reasons for screening out a referral vary by state policy, but may
include one or more of the following: Does not concern child abuse and neglect; Does not
contain enough information for a CPS response to occur; Response by another agency is
deemed more appropriate; Children in the referral are the responsibility of another agency
or jurisdiction (e.g., military installation or tribe); Children in the referral are older than
18 years.”).
12
PPS Policy and Procedural Manual, KAN. DEP’T CHILDREN & FAM., (Jan. 1,
2020),
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/Documents/PPM_Forms/Policy_and_Procedure_Ma
nual.pdf.; Prevention and Prevention & Protection Services: Child Protective Services
Reports, KAN. DEP’T FOR CHILDREN & FAM. (last visited Nov. 10, 2019),
http://www.dcf.ks.gov/services/PPS/Pages/CPSReports.aspx.
13
Devon Fasbinder, FF12: DCF Child Welfare Investigators Face High Caseloads,
KWCH12 (May 31, 2019), https://www.kwch.com/content/news/FF12-DCF-childwelfare-investigators-face-high-caseloads-510678991.html.
14
See e.g., PPS Policy and Procedural Manual, supra note 12 (the Protection
Services Policy and Procedural Manual for Kansas is 851 pages long and has not one
mention of “strip search,” “undress,” or even “warrant.”).
15
Prevention and Prevention & Protection Services: Child Protective Services
Reports, supra note 12.
10
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the investigations prove no child abuse took place, then each of these
children could have been subjected to invasive searches without proper
guidance. Perhaps the reason this number is so high is because, without
clear legislative guidelines, caseworkers are searching every child, even
those for whom the search may not be warranted at all.
The structure of this Comment will proceed in three parts. Section
II establishes the context of this issue including background about the
Fourth Amendment, the special needs doctrine, and the dispositions of
the courts in the circuit split. Section III is an analysis of the Woodard
decision and why the special needs doctrine should not apply to searches
of children who are suspected victims of child abuse. Section III
concludes by outlining proposed legislation clarifying that the special
needs doctrine should not apply to searches of suspected victims of child
abuse.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the context of Doe v. Woodard and how it
fits into the larger circuit split, this section outlines the Fourth
Amendment and its exceptions, the special needs doctrine’s history and
tests for application, and the disposition of each case in the circuit split.
A. The Fourth Amendment and its Exceptions
The Fourth Amendment creates a constitutional guarantee for
“people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”16 Probable
cause sufficient to issue a warrant requires “knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information of facts and circumstances.”17 Further, judges
must take into account the “totality of the circumstances” when
determining whether sufficient probable cause exists to issue a warrant.18
However, “probable cause” is not clearly defined and there are no rigid
boxes to check; rather, probable cause is a flexible term that leaves room
for judicial discretion in issuing warrants.19
To determine if a search or seizure is within the bounds of the
Fourth Amendment, it must be reasonable.20 A warrantless search is
16

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 603 (2d Cir. 1999).
18
Lauren Kobrick, I am Not Law Enforcement! Why the Special Needs Exception to
the Fourth Amendment Should Apply to Caseworkers Investigating Allegations of Child
Abuse, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1505, 1514 (Apr. 2017).
19
Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 603 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)).
20
Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 1986).
17
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within one of
the established exceptions.21 Among these exceptions are: (1) consent;
(2) exigent circumstances; and (3) a special need.22 This Comment
focuses exclusively on the special needs exception because it is the issue
driving the circuit split.
B. The Special Needs Doctrine
The special needs doctrine is difficult to narrow down to one simple
test in one defined set of circumstances. For this reason, it is helpful to
understand the evolution of the special needs doctrine, the different tests
used to determine whether the special needs doctrine has been correctly
applied, and the various circumstances where the use of the special needs
doctrine has been upheld.
1. History and Evolution of the Special Needs Doctrine
The seed for the special needs doctrine was first planted in Camara
v. Municipal Court.23 In Camara, the plaintiff claimed a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when a municipal worker came to
perform a housing code inspection without her consent, exigent
circumstances, or a warrant.24 While the U.S. Supreme Court did not
explicitly use the phrase “special need” to determine this exception, the
Court acknowledged “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search,”25 and lowered the
probable cause standard for obtaining a warrant for a housing
inspection.26
However, it wasn’t until nearly two decades later that Justice
Blackmun coined the phrase “special needs doctrine” in his 1985
concurring opinion in N.J. v. T.L.O.27 In T.L.O., a high school principal
suspected a student was smoking marijuana at school, and while on
public school property, he searched the student’s bag without her
consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant.28 When determining
21

Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1508.
Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019).
23
Camera v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 538 (“The passage of a certain period without inspection might of itself be
sufficient in a given situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of ‘probable
cause’ required by the Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search
that is being sought.”) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas,
J., dissenting)).
27
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
28
Id. at 328.
22
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whether the search was reasonable, the majority used a balancing test to
weigh the intrusiveness of the search against the government’s interest in
conducting the search.29 In a 6–3 decision, the majority reasoned that
this was a reasonable search because the school had a reasonable interest
in preventing drug use at school and the search was not overly invasive.30
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun emphasized that there was a
“special need” for the principal to be able to act immediately to protect
other school children from actions that could threaten their safety and the
educational process itself.31 Therefore, the Court allowed for a
warrantless search when there was a “special need,” thus creating an
additional exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.32
In 2001, the Court further developed the special needs doctrine in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston by emphasizing the importance of the
primary purpose of the search.33 In this case, a hospital conducted drug
tests on pregnant women without a warrant or consent and reported
positive drug tests to the police.34 The Fourth Circuit found this testing
admissible as a “special need” and upheld the constitutionality of this
warrantless search.35 However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding this
was an unreasonable search because the primary purpose of the search
was to arrest pregnant women and force them into substance abuse
treatment.36 The Court viewed this purpose as being too intertwined with
law enforcement; therefore a warrant was required.37
These three cases highlight the evolution of the special needs
doctrine. Camara introduced the idea that sometimes the burden of
obtaining a warrant outweighs the necessity of the search or seizure.38
T.L.O. established the balancing test which weighs the intrusiveness of
the search against the government’s interest.39 Ferguson established the
use of the primary purpose test, which says if the primary purpose of the
search furthers law enforcement actions, the special needs doctrine does
not apply.40 While these cases are not an exhaustive history of the special
needs doctrine, they highlight the general background of the doctrine and
its applicable tests.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 351.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 353.
See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id. at 85-86.
Camera v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–43 (1985).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 81–82 (2001).
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2. Special Needs Doctrine Tests and Application
Speaking broadly, a search or seizure falls within the special needs
doctrine when a state actor’s need—beyond that of criminal law
enforcement—necessitates an immediate search, but makes the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
impracticable or irrelevant.41 If there is entanglement with law
enforcement, the special needs doctrine does not apply because there is
“a bright line between law enforcement purposes and all other
purposes.”42 Courts use the primary purpose test to determine whether
there is enough entanglement with law enforcement to block the special
needs doctrine’s application. If the primary purpose of the warrantless
search is to “generate evidence for law enforcement purposes” then the
special needs doctrine does not apply.43 The purpose of this bright-line
rule is to prevent law enforcement officials from side-stepping the
warrant requirement by collecting information through non-law
enforcement individuals under the special needs doctrine.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined what qualifies as a
“special need.”44 In situations where courts have upheld the application
of the special needs doctrine, there is not much of a common thread
between people or locations, making it difficult to pinpoint when and
where this doctrine applies.45 For example, the Court has upheld this
doctrine in hospitals, public schools, and state agencies;46 and it has
applied to probationers, parolees, student-athletes, students participating
in extracurricular activities, people working in highly regulated
industries, and federal customs officials.47 This varied list of people and
places does not make defining a “special need” much easier. However,
this case law affirms that there is significant room for advocacy to argue
for or against a situation being a “special need.”48
41

Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1519.
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child
Protection Investigations, and the Need To Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs
Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 383 (Dec. 2012) (quoting Justice Blackmun in T.L.O.)
43
Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1509.
44
Id. at 1523.
45
See infra notes 46–48.
46
Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1523.
47
Adam Pié, The Monster Under the Bed: The Imaginary Circuit Split and the
Nightmares Created in the Special Needs Doctrine’s Application to Child Abuse, 65
VAND. L. REV. 563, 573-74 (Mar. 2012).
48
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (applying the
special needs doctrine to allow drug testing of student athletes); Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831–32 (2002) (applying
the special needs doctrine to allow searches of students involved in extracurricular
activities); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–81 (2001) (holding the special needs
42
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In the sense that a “special need” makes obtaining a warrant
impracticable, applying the special needs doctrine requires that the
subsequent search or seizure must still be reasonable to survive a
constitutional challenge. Courts use a balancing test to determine
reasonableness.49 This test, as first used in T.L.O., balances the
intrusiveness of the search against the state’s interest in conducting the
search.50 Another standard used to determine reasonableness is the twofold inquiry established in O’Connor v. Ortega, which asked whether the
search was: (1) “justified at its inception,” and (2) reasonably related to
the circumstances for which the search was generated in the first place.51
A search is “justified at its inception” if the state had “reasonable
grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence.”52 Further, a
search is reasonably related to the circumstances for which it was
generated if the search is not “excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”53
Essentially, the court balances an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy with the government’s interest in performing the
search.54 It is important to note that the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is a subjective interest; whereas the government’s
interest in the search is an objective one. This further demonstrates the
complexity of this rule and how courts can reach varying outcomes when
applying the special needs doctrine.
C. The Circuit Split
Due to the complex nature of the special needs doctrine, there is
currently a circuit split over whether the special needs doctrine applies
when a caseworker searches a child’s body for indicia of abuse. Courts
today are wrestling with whether qualified immunity applies; whether the
law is “clearly established;” and most significantly, whether the special
needs doctrine applies to searches of suspected victims of child abuse. To
better understand how Doe v. Woodard fits into the split, this Section
provides a brief overview of each court’s disposition on the special needs
doctrine’s applicability.
doctrine did not apply because the primary purpose was to collect information for law
enforcement purposes); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633,
2642–43 (2009) (holding the special needs doctrine did not apply because the scope of
the search was too invasive in light of the purpose of the search).
49
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985).
50
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–43; Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1520.
51
Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1521
52
Pié, supra note 47, at 572.
53
Id.
54
Gupta-Kagan, surpa note 42, at 387.
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The first two circuits to address this issue were the Fourth and
Seventh Circuit Courts, which held that the special needs doctrine should
apply.55 In Darryl v. Coler, the Seventh Circuit applied the special needs
doctrine and employed the two-fold test of whether the search was
“justified at its inception” and reasonable in its scope.56 While the
Seventh Circuit found a warrant was not necessary, they still noted, “we
are not convinced, on the basis of the record before us, that the [social
worker guideline], as it now exists, ensures that the searches will always
be reasonable.”57 Therefore, they found that the allegations of child
abuse in the facts and circumstances of the current case constituted a
“special need” allowing the search to take place without a warrant.58
However, they also cautioned against a generalized holding that these
searches will always be reasonable.59
The Fourth Circuit in Wildauer v. Frederick County, was the next
to address this matter and they issued a short opinion echoing the
sentiment of Darryl.60 The court used the same balancing test and
determined the government’s interest in protecting foster children
outweighed the foster parent’s expectation of privacy.61 This opinion did
not directly discuss the special needs doctrine, but applied the same
balancing test and cited Darryl as its main authority on this point.62
In contrast, subsequent cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuit Courts held that the special needs doctrine should not apply
to caseworkers who conduct bodily examinations of suspected victims of
child abuse.63 This shows that since the decision in Wildauer in 1993,
55

Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 1986); Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty.,
993 F.2d 369, 372 (4th Cir. 1993).
56
Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 903 (7th Cir. 1986). Coler consolidated two appeals
cases. Id. at 894. One involved eight families suing the Department of Child and Family
Services for strip searching their children at school after anonymous reports of abuse or
neglect without obtaining a warrant. Id. at 896. The second case also involved an
anonymous report about abuse and neglect of elementary-aged children. Id. at 905. The
caseworker visited the children at home and saw no signs of abuse or neglect, yet still
conducted a strip search of the children the following day at school. Id. at 906.
57
Id. at 905.
58
Id. at 901.
59
Id. at 904.
60
Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993). In Wildauer,
social workers conducted in-home medical examinations of eleven foster children
without first obtaining a warrant after noticing signs of child neglect during an earlier,
unrelated home visit. Id. at 371, 373.
61
Id. at 373.
62
Id.
63
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty.
Soc. Serv.’s for Child. & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3rd Cir. 1989); Roe v. Tex. Dep’t.
of Protective & Regul. Serv.’s, 299 F.3d 395, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2002); Calabretta v. Floyd,
189 F.3d 808, 816 (9th Cir. 1999).
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there has been a pattern of courts not applying the special needs doctrine
to searches of this type.64
The Third Circuit issued the first case which began the rift of what
would later become a circuit split in Good v. Dauphin County Social
Services for Children & Youth. This case is different from Darryl and
Wildauer because the search was conducted at the child’s home rather
than at school.65 In Good, the Third Circuit held that when social
workers examine children for signs of abuse, the special needs doctrine
does not apply.66 Rather, a warrant should be obtained unless there is
consent or exigent circumstances.67
The Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit’s holding in
Calabretta v. Floyd.68 Similar to Good, this case also involved a social
worker coming to the alleged victim’s home and conducting a strip
search.69 The Ninth Circuit held without consent or an emergency, a
warrant must be obtained, otherwise the search is unconstitutional.70 The
special needs doctrine is not listed as an exception to the warrant
requirement in this circumstance.
The Second Circuit in Tenenbaum v. Williams recognized the
special needs doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement but
declined to decide whether it applied when searching or seizing a
suspected victim of child abuse.71 Instead, the focus was on whether
there was an exigent circumstance.72 This case involved the suspected
child being removed from school and taken to the hospital to be
examined for signs of abuse at the request of the caseworker.73 The
Second Circuit found that without parental consent or emergency
64

Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1293 (10th Cir. 2019).
Good, 891 F.2d at 1087. In Good, a police officer and social services caseworker
showed up after 10:00 PM at the Good home to forcefully conduct a strip search of
seven-year-old Jochebed Good without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 1089–90.
66
Id. at 1903.
67
Id.
68
Calabretta,189 F.3d at 808. In Calabretta, a police officer and social worker
entered the Calabretta home, despite parental protest and without obtaining a warrant
first, and conducted strip searches of the children despite protesting from the children and
their mother. Id. at 810–12.
69
Id. at 817.
70
Id.
71
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 588–92. In Tenenbaum, a five-year-old child with elective mutism
communicated at one point to her teacher she was being touched inappropriately, but
when asked the same questions later by a caseworker, denied being touched
inappropriately. Id. at 589–90. The caseworker conducted a home search and found no
evidence of abuse or neglect, yet the next day had the child taken to the hospital for a
sexual assault exam without a warrant or parental consent. Id. at 591.
65
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circumstances, a warrant should have been obtained.74 In this case, the
court emphasized the timing of the investigation and reasoned that there
was sufficient time to obtain a warrant.75
The last Circuit Court opinion in the split, up until Doe v. Woodard,
is Roe v. Texas Department of Protective & Regulatory Services.76 Roe is
the only case in the circuit split post-Ferguson, so the Fifth Circuit
applied the primary purpose test and found that the caseworker’s actions
were too intertwined with law enforcement, so a warrant should have
been obtained.77 The Fifth Circuit went on to say that in order for a
caseworker to perform a visual body and cavity search on a child they
must obtain a warrant, parental consent, or act under exigent
circumstances—none of which were present in this case.78 Notably, the
Fifth Circuit did not list the special needs doctrine as one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
These cases establish a circuit split over whether caseworkers can
perform visual body searches of suspected victims of child abuse without
a warrant under the special needs exception. These cases stretched from
1985 to 2002, yet this issue has been left largely unresolved. This
confusion was brought to light again in January 2019, when the Tenth
Circuit joined the split in Doe v. Woodard.79
D. Doe v. Woodard
Doe v. Woodard is a case about a four-year-old child, I.B., who was
undressed and photographed by a caseworker inspecting her for signs of
child abuse. To understand how this case furthers the circuit split, this
Comment provides a general overview of the facts, claims, and holding
of the Tenth Circuit.
In December 2014, an anonymous source called the El Paso County
Department of Human Services to report potential signs of abuse on
I.B.’s body.80 The source identified these signs as “bumps on her face, a
nickel-sized bruise on her neck, a small red mark on her lower back, two

74

Id. at 594.
Id.
76
Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir.
2002). In Roe, six-year-old Jackie was reported for showing signs of sexual abuse after
touching herself and other six-year-olds inappropriately. Id. at 398. Following this
report, a caseworker conducted a strip search and cavity search of Jackie, which included
photographing her vagina and buttocks without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 399.
77
Id. at 407–08.
78
Id.
79
Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019).
80
Id. at 1285.
75
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small cuts on her stomach, and bruised knees.”81 Department of Human
Services caseworker, April Woodard, responded to the call by visiting
I.B. at school, removing her from class, and taking her to the nurse’s
office.82 Woodard removed I.B.’s clothing to visually inspect her body.83
While I.B. was naked, Woodard took photos of I.B.’s back, stomach, and
buttocks on her cell phone.84 At no time did Woodard have a warrant or
parental consent to conduct the search, but she was acting under the
“unwritten, but well-established county-wide policy” to conduct these
visual inspections without obtaining parental consent or a court order.85
The next day Woodard continued her investigation by conducting a
home search. Woodard spoke to I.B.’s mother who cooperated with the
investigation.86 However, Woodard did not tell Ms. Doe she had already
inspected and photographed I.B.’s body.87 Woodard closed the
investigation of I.B. and reported the case as “unfounded.”88 It was not
until after the case was closed that I.B. told her mother about being
undressed and photographed at school by Woodard. I.B. said, “she
hoped she would not see Ms. Woodard again because ‘I don’t like it
when she takes all my clothes off.’”89
After hearing these statements from her daughter, Ms. Doe
approached Woodard and asked about the search.90 At first, Woodard
denied the allegations, but, two months later, she admitted she had
undressed and photographed I.B. during her investigation.91 Woodard
justified her search by telling Ms. Doe that child abuse investigations
take priority over parental rights.92 Following this, the Does filed a
section 1983 claim alleging a violation of I.B.’s Fourth Amendment
Rights on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure, and a
Fourteenth Amendment violation of the Does’ parental rights.93 This
Comment will focus only on the Fourth Amendment claims.
The Colorado District Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment
claims, arguing Woodard was entitled to qualified immunity because the
law was not so “clearly established” to “give [Woodard] fair warning
81
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84
85
86
87
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90
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285–86.
Id. at 1286.
Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Woodward, 912 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Id.
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that the taking photographs of portions of I.B.’s unclothed body required
a warrant.”94 Further, the district court held the Does’ complaint lacked
sufficient allegations to show that, based on the special needs doctrine,
the search was “unjustified at its inception” or “improper in scope.”95
The Does appealed, and the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district
court’s dismissal of the Does’ Fourth Amendment claim based on
Woodard’s qualified immunity.96 The Tenth Circuit structured its
discussion of the Fourth Amendment by first looking at qualified
immunity and what it means for the law to be “clearly established,” and
second, whether the special needs doctrine applies.97
First, the Tenth Circuit decided that the lower court was correct in
applying qualified immunity because there was no clearly established
law regarding whether a warrant was needed to search I.B.98 The Does
argued on appeal that qualified immunity should not apply because the
law was, in fact, clearly established based on existing case law regarding
whether a warrant was needed to search and photograph a child.99
However, the Tenth Circuit addressed each case the Does cited and
distinguished them from the facts at hand, reiterating the fact that
“clearly established” law is particularized to the facts and cannot be
“defined at a high level of generality.”100 The court also acknowledged
the circuit split to emphasize the lack of clearly established law.101
Next, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding that the
appellants failed to show why the special needs doctrine should not
apply.102 The court noted that even if the special needs doctrine applied,
it would need to satisfy the two-prong reasonableness test:103 (1) that the
search was “justified at its inception”; and (2) that the search “was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances.”104 However, the
appellants “offer[ed] almost no analysis to support their contention” that
the search was unreasonable.105 Therefore, because the law was not
94

Id. at 1287.
Id.
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Id. at 1288.
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Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289-93 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Id. at 1293–94.
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Id. at 1292 (addressing argument based on Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir.
1993), Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003), Roska ex rel. Roska v.
Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2003), and Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67 (2001)).
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Id. at 1296.
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N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 329 (1985).
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Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1295 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S.
at 325).
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clearly established and the appellants failed to show that the special
needs doctrine was inapplicable to I.B.’s case, the ruling of the lower
court dismissing the Fourth Amendment claims under qualified
immunity was affirmed.106
Judge Briscoe dissented in part, arguing that the law the Does cited
was sufficient to show the law was “clearly established” regarding the
application of the special needs doctrine to the search of a child’s
body.107 Judge Briscoe argued Dubbs v. Head Start108 and Safford
Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding109 are factually similar enough
to I.B.’s case to give Woodard notice that her actions were
unconstitutional.110 She argues that because these cases held that searches
by adults on school property without parental notification, consent, or
presence were unconstitutional, the searches were sufficiently similar to
put Woodard on notice that her actions were unconstitutional.111
Additionally, Judge Briscoe argued even if the special needs doctrine
applied, the search was still unreasonable because “the content of the
suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion,” and there was ample
time to obtain parental consent.112 Judge Briscoe would reverse and
remand all Fourth Amendment holdings.113
In Woodard, the Tenth Circuit’s holding is hinged on its finding
that the Does failed to show “clearly established law that the special
needs doctrine could not support the search in this case,” and also failed
to show “that a warrant was clearly required.”114 The majority held that
the need to obtain a warrant to search a suspected victim of child abuse
was not clearly established because not “every reasonable official would
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”115 In sum, the
court notes it is possible that the special needs doctrine could have
applied in this case, but it did not reach the doctrine’s applicability
because Woodard was shielded by qualified immunity.116
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Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1302-03 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
Dubbs v. Head Start, 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003).
Stafford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1303 (10th Cir. 2019) (Briscoe, J., concurring).
Id. at 1305–06.
Id. at 1307–08.
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Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1292-94 (10th Cir. 2019).
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III. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Woodard indicates that the
circuit split over whether the special needs doctrine applies to searches of
suspected victims of child abuse is becoming more problematic. The
Tenth Circuit should block the special needs doctrine from applying as
an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when
searching suspected victims of child abuse. The special needs doctrine
should not apply for three reasons: (1) the doctrine and its accompanying
tests are too nuanced and complex for consistent application; (2) the
consequences that could result from unconstitutional searches are severe,
so all due process should be afforded; and (3) the doctrine could be
abused. This Section also includes proposed legislation to “clearly
establish” the law in this area. Clarifying the law would prevent
qualified immunity from shielding government employees and allow
victims of unconstitutional searches to recover.
A. The Special Needs Doctrine is too Complex and Ambiguous to Allow
for Consistent Application
The special needs doctrine should not be an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement when searching children for indicia
of abuse because the doctrine is ambiguous, complex, and leads to
inconsistent application and results. Courts have allowed the application
of the special needs doctrine to a broad range of situations and
locations.117 Further, if it does apply, the two-fold test to determine
reasonableness offers little guidance for consistent application.118 This
leaves ample room for advocacy but produces inconsistent results.119
Again, when the law is not clearly established, qualified immunity will
likely apply, and victims of unconstitutional searches cannot recover.
Therefore, the law should be clarified to narrow the circumstances in
which a “special need” is apparent; otherwise, the confusion will persist.
When determining if the special needs doctrine applies, it is
important to note that there is a bright-line rule that blocks its application

117

See supra notes 46-47.
Kobrick, supra note 18, at 1514.
119
See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (finding the two-prong
reasonableness test was satisfied when searching plaintiff’s office without his knowledge
after complaints of sexual harassment); but see Stafford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 369–72 (2009) (finding the two-prong reasonableness test not
satisfied because the search was overly intrusive in light of the nature of the infraction
when asking a girl to strip down to her undergarments to see if she was hiding drugs in
her bra and panties).
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when there is a strong law enforcement presence.120 The rule aims to
prevent law enforcement officers from avoiding the warrant requirement
by having social workers conduct warrantless searches under the
protection of the special needs doctrine. The warrant requirement would
be eviscerated if law enforcement officers could gather evidence from
the reports of social workers who are not required to obtain warrants as
long as there is a “special need.”121 Therefore, if the primary purpose of
the search is to gather evidence for law enforcement, the special needs
doctrine cannot apply.122
Bright-line rules seem as though they would be clear and
straightforward; however, it is still difficult to determine whether a
search of a suspected victim of child abuse will lead to excessive
entanglement with law enforcement. In a situation where there may be an
abusive parent, the potential for law enforcement entanglement will
always be lurking in the background. Further, determining the “primary”
purpose from a series of reasons for conducting a search seems entirely
subjective. A social worker may argue the primary purpose was for the
protection of the child, a non-law-enforcement purpose. However, it
could also be argued the search was conducted to aid law enforcement in
arresting abusive parents, which would preclude the special needs
doctrine from applying. Between the uncertainties in the seemingly broad
application of the special needs doctrine, the difficulty identifying the
level of law enforcement entanglement, and isolating the primary
purpose of the search, the special needs doctrine should not apply to
searches of suspected victims of child abuse.
Even if the court determines the special needs doctrine applies, the
test to determine reasonableness is also unclear. The test involves a twofold inquiry into whether the search was: (1) “justified at its inception”
and (2) reasonably related to the circumstances for which the search was
generated in the first place.123 The search is justified if there was reason
to believe the search would turn up evidence124 and it is not “excessively
intrusive in light of the . . . nature of the infraction.”125
These factors are too broad, and the reasoning attorneys can proffer
to prove the search was justified and reasonable in scope appear to be
entirely subjective, which could lead to inconsistent application of the
120

Gupta-Kagan, surpa note 42, at 355 (quoting Justice Blackmun in N.J. v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
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Id. at 400 (“[T]he [bright-line] test also provides a mechanism to ferret out
administrative searches used as a subterfuge for criminal investigations.”).
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test. The first prong, “justified at its inception,” is flawed because it
focuses only on the mindset of the person conducting the search and
whether they believed the search would turn up evidence. This is a
problem because one person’s subjective belief that they are justified in
conducting a search is sufficient, even if any other person would have
thought the opposite.
Other objective factors should also be considered when determining
whether the search would turn up evidence. For example, a bulge in the
person’s pocket or an attempt to flee may be objective reasons to believe
the search would turn up evidence. By involving objective evidence and
not merely the mindset of the searcher, this allows for more concrete
evidence suggesting the search would turn up evidence rather than post
hoc justifications.
In addressing the second prong, the law should clarify what it
means to be “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex . . . and the
nature of the infraction.” This standard is problematic because it leaves
no guidelines for what is acceptable in light of these factors. There is no
way to know at what point a seemingly acceptable search crosses the line
into “excessively intrusive.” The law should place more specific limits
on the scope of the search, such as listing certain infractions that may
warrant a bodily search or requiring that searches involving undressing
must be conducted by a medical professional. Or perhaps after a certain
age, a search should only be conducted by someone of the same sex.126
By offering more tailored restrictions or examples of what an acceptable
search looks like, it could help clarify what searches are reasonable in
light of the age, sex, and nature of the infraction of the person to be
searched.
In essence, it is unclear when and how the special needs doctrine
applies, which leads to inconsistencies in its application, as evidenced by
the current circuit split. This creates further confusion and does the
opposite of creating “clearly established” law. Therefore, the special
needs doctrine should not be applied to caseworkers searching children’s
bodies for indicia of abuse.
B. The Potential Consequences for Searches of Suspected Victims of
Child Abuse are Severe so Full Due Process Should be Afforded
The special needs doctrine should not apply to warrantless searches
of suspected victims of child abuse because the potential consequences
of these searches could be severe. Therefore, full due process should be
afforded by requiring a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant,
126

See discussion infra Part III.D.
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acting under parental consent, or acting under exigent circumstances. A
search of this kind could result in one of two findings: the child is being
abused, or the child is not being abused. Regardless of the outcome, the
child has now experienced being stripped, inspected, sometimes touched,
and sometimes photographed by a stranger.127 Parents now must explain
to their child why a stranger was allowed to look at them, touch them,
and photograph them while naked. Additionally, the parents could be at
risk of losing custody rights, and now their children have to cope with
being separated from their parents.128 With consequences this severe, the
special needs doctrine should not be an exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Rather, to afford sufficient
constitutional protection, a caseworker should be required to show
probable cause to obtain a warrant before conducting a search.
The special needs doctrine should not apply in this context because
the risk of a parent losing custody of their child is so high, that all due
process should be afforded. As Justice Blackmun noted, “there can be
few losses more grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”129
Additionally, Justice Stephens wrote, “[a]lthough both deprivations [a
prison sentence and termination of parental rights] are serious, often the
deprivation of parental rights will be more grievous than the two . . . .
[and] both deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law.”130
After searching a child for signs of abuse, the possibility of both a
child being removed from their parents and the parent being arrested are
foreseeable consequences. This is traumatic for both parents and
children.131 No matter the finding, children will likely suffer
psychological harm from the invasiveness of these searches. For
example, if the child was being abused, not only will they suffer
psychological harm from the abuse, but this trauma can be exacerbated
when they are removed from their home and their parents.132 However,
127

See Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019); Calabretta v. Floyd,
189 F.3d 808, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2002).
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See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 42, at 415–16.
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Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv’s, 452 U.S. 18, 40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“The first and most important point in the analysis is that the foreseeable
consequence of child protection searches and seizures—removal of children from their
parents and placement in state custody—is severe and of immense constitutional
magnitude to both parents and children. It directly implicates fundamental constitutional
rights of such a pedigree that they trigger many procedural protections.” Gupta-Kagan,
supra note 18, at 422.
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See Wendy Jennings, Separating Families Without Due Process: Hidden Child
Removals Closer to Home, 22 CITY UNIV. N.Y. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019) (“research
overwhelmingly demonstrates the harmful and emotionally damaging effects of removing
children from their parents”); Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect
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even if the child was not suffering from abuse, the invasiveness of the
search can still have lasting effects on the child’s psyche.133
In order to protect parents and children in these situations,
caseworkers should be required to obtain a warrant before conducting a
search. To obtain a warrant, a judge must conclude there is enough
evidence to support the probable cause that a child is being abused.
Probable cause can be shown through witness statements or other
evidence, however, suspicion or belief by itself is not sufficient.134 This
is meant as a safeguard to prevent unconstitutional invasive searches
from taking place when there is only a suspicion or belief of abuse.
Rather, there must be enough evidence for a judge to decide that a child
is possibly being abused. Even though the bar for probable cause is low,
the procedural requirements to obtain a warrant still afford parents and
children more due process than acting on suspicion alone.
The other two exceptions to the warrant requirement previously
mentioned (consent, and exigent circumstances) also contain inherent
safeguards to afford adequate constitutional protections. Parental consent
would afford full procedural protections because it would alert the parent
to the accusations against them or others and allow for there to be

of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459
(2003) (“affected families may suffer enduring harm psychologically, financially, and in
countless other ways from the stresses of removal and its aftermath”); Nell
Clement, Note, Do “Reasonable Efforts” Require Cultural Competence? The Importance
of Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare System,
5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 397, 418-19 (2008) (“Removal of children from their
families and cultural community has potentially devastating effects on the identity and
psychological health of the removed children . . . . In addition to psychological issues that
may arise in children removed from their families . . . children are likely to suffer identity
issues”).
133
Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment,
26 UNIV. S. F. L. REV. 1, 13 (1991) (“[E]ven though the strip search might be a one-time
occurrence, it can be traumatic and have a long-term negative impact on the child.”).
Strip searches of children have been characterized as “‘demeaning, dehumanizing,
undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, and repulsive.’” Id. at
2. Courts have recognized the trauma resulting from searches of this type. See Flores v.
Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665, 667 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (“Children are especially susceptible to
possible traumas from strip searches.”); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) (“[H]umiliation and psychological harms [are] associated with such a search.”).
Further, psychologists note that strip searches of children have a greater impact because
“as children approach adolescence, privacy becomes important as a marker of
independence and self-differentiation. Threats to the privacy of school aged children may
be reasonably hypothesized to . . . [function as] threats to self-esteem.” Shatz et
al., supra, at 11 (quoting Gary B. Melton, Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and
Psychological Concepts Compatible?, 62 NEB. L. REV. 455, 488 (1983)).
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Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964).
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consent, and even parental presence at these searches.135 Exigent
circumstances are essentially emergency situations where action can be
taken immediately because there is no time to obtain a warrant or
consent.136 Given the seriousness of child abuse allegations, it could well
be that there is an emergency situation which could result in harm to the
child if action is not taken immediately. However, if the caseworker
relies on exigent circumstances to uphold the search, they have the
burden to prove that an exigent circumstance existed to justify their
warrantless search.137 Proving exigent circumstances is a higher bar
because the caseworker would need to show an emergency existed,
rather than merely showing that obtaining a warrant was “impracticable,”
which is required under the special needs doctrine.
There are circumstances in which the special needs doctrine
applies, and the court has upheld in other contexts the necessity of this
additional exception; however, searches of a suspected victim of child
abuse should not be included amongst these circumstances. The
warrantless searches upheld under the special needs doctrine were
materially different from the search of a suspected victim of child abuse
because the consequences in the former cases were more temporary and
minor. For example, being reprimanded at school for smoking in the
bathroom138 or being fined for a housing code violation were
consequences of a warrantless search under the special needs doctrine.139
These consequences, while still injurious for the person being searched,
135
Parental presence may be a hinderance to learning the truth if the parent is in fact
abusing the child. The abusive parent’s presence could prevent the child from speaking
openly and truthfully about abuse. However, in order to reap the benefits of having a
parent present during an intimate search, parental consent could include the presence of a
non-suspect parent or a non-suspect advocate of whom the child knows and will feel
comforted by their presence.
136
“Exigent circumstances [which would justify warrantless search] are those
requiring immediate aid or action, and, while there is no definite list of what constitutes
exigent circumstances, several established examples include the risk of removal or
destruction of the evidence, danger to the lives of police officers or others, and the hot
pursuit of a suspect.” Stutte v. State, 432 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). Exigent
circumstances arise when the need for prompt action is imperative because a threat of
physical harm to innocent individuals exists. Commonwealth v. Copeland, 955 A.2d
396, 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). See Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456
F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[E]xigent circumstances [as will justify a warrantless
search or seizure] exist when an immediate and serious threat to the safety of . . . the
public is present.”); Hill v. State, 181 S.W.3d 611, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“Exigent
circumstances [for a warrantless search] exist if the time needed to obtain a warrant
would endanger life.”).
137
See People v. Krinitsky, 982 N.E.2d 848 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); State v. Clayton, 155
So. 3d 290 (Ala. 2014).
138
N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
139
Camera v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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are not as severe or as permanent as the consequence of a child being
removed from their home or suffering from lasting psychological harm.
With an outcome this permanent and harsh, the special needs doctrine is
an inappropriate exception to the warrant requirement in the context of
searching the bodies of suspected victims of child abuse. Rather, full
constitutional protections should be afforded either by obtaining a
warrant, parental consent, or proving there was an exigent circumstance
that allowed for immediate action.
C. The Special Needs Doctrine Could Be Abused
The special needs doctrine should not apply to searches of
suspected victims of child abuse because it could allow for invasive
searches to take place with no legal remedy. The person conducting the
search could have multiple levels of protection from liability between the
special needs doctrine’s exception to the warrant requirement, as well as
qualified immunity (if they are a government employee).140 This could
prevent those children who were subjected to invasive searches from
obtaining a legal remedy.141 Further, it could allow for abuse of the
special needs doctrine by permitting invasive searches with no legal
repercussions for the investigator who has violated another’s Fourth
Amendment rights. This is especially true when recognizing that many
families would not have the resources to challenge government action
through a civil suit, leaving government misconduct unchecked.
There is potential for abuse of the special needs doctrine because
people may continue to conduct invasive searches of children without
obtaining a warrant as long as they can show after-the-fact that there was
some “special need” that made obtaining a warrant impracticable. This is
different from appearing before a judge to show probable cause for a
warrant because explaining the “special need” can be a post hoc
reasoning. Under the special needs doctrine, no judge is standing by to
decide whether a special need exists before the search takes place.
Rather, the special needs doctrine is only discussed if there is a resulting
lawsuit, at which time the party who conducted the search can put forth
an argument that they were acting under the special needs doctrine’s
exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, this doctrine is not a
procedural safeguard against unreasonable searches; but rather, it is a
safety net for those who conducted the test to rely on in case they are
sued.
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If government employees continue to be protected both by the
special needs doctrine and qualified immunity, due to the lack of clearly
established law, then there are no legal repercussions. With no
repercussions, this doctrine could be abused and become widely used as
a way around the warrant requirement. Thus, the special needs doctrine
should not apply to strip searches of children and social workers should
be acting either under parental consent, exigent circumstances, or a
warrant.
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
As previously noted, a large part of the issue surrounding
caseworkers conducting warrantless searches of suspected victims of
child abuse is the fact that the law is uncertain. When the law is
uncertain and not clearly established, qualified immunity applies to
shield government employees, like caseworkers, from liability.142 This
leaves victims of invasive searches with no remedy. In order to prevent
victims of invasive searches from being denied a remedy, the law needs
to be clarified. By clarifying the law, qualified immunity would not
apply because the law would be clearly established. When qualified
immunity is taken out of the picture, courts can move on to actually
analyze the reasonableness of the search rather than dismissing lawsuits
at the onset because of qualified immunity.
There needs to be clear, straightforward legislation defining the
scope of these searches so there is no issue over whether the law is
“clearly established.” By creating clear legislation, caseworkers will have
more straightforward guidelines on how to conduct a constitutional
search.
While there are federal statutes providing minimum standards for
assessing and handling child maltreatment,143 each state is still
responsible for setting its own guidelines and standards.144 Despite the
142

Id. at 1289 (“[Q]ualified immunity . . . shields public officials from damages
actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.”
(quoting Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014))
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(2018), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cps2018.pdf. The Child Protective
Services has federal guidelines, but states can still adopt their own policies. Id. ”Each
child welfare agency may be organized differently based on state and tribal laws,
policies,
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geography.” Id. at
19.
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jurisdiction.” Id. at 20.
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existence of federal and state guidelines, there is still significant
confusion over the bounds of searches of suspected victims of child
abuse, as evidenced by the circuit split.
Therefore, this Comment proposes simplified legislation for states
to adopt to clarify the law for caseworkers searching suspected victims of
child abuse. First, the special needs doctrine should be prohibited from
being applied as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. Second, for caseworkers to inspect a child’s body and
invade their privacy, the caseworker must obtain a warrant unless there is
an exigent circumstance, or they obtain parental consent. Ideally, a
caseworker will always obtain a warrant so that these searches cannot be
conducted unless probable cause is shown. If there is truly no time for a
warrant to be obtained, then an exigent circumstance is likely present,
and the caseworker may take immediate action to protect a child from an
emergency circumstance.145 Further, parental consent would also be a
valid exception to the warrant requirement because it protects the privacy
interests of both the parent and the child.146
Once it has been determined that a search can take place, there
should be clarifying guidelines for the caseworkers inspecting children’s
bodies through either obtaining a warrant, obtaining parental consent, or
acting under exigent circumstances This Comment proposes clarifying
guidelines, which are largely based on criteria the court considered in
Darryl v. Coler from the Seventh Circuit.147 In Darryl, the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services Child Abuse and Neglect
Investigation Decisions Handbook listed four options for a caseworker
who deems a physical examination necessary: (1) require the caretaker to
take the child to a physician for a physical examination; (2) take the child
to a physician for a physical examination; (3) disrobe the child and
conduct a cursory physical examination while the caretaker is present; or
(4) permit the school nurse to examine the child.148
Additionally, the Handbook had three supplementary restrictions:
(1) in cases of sexual abuse, a physician shall conduct the examination;
(2) an examination of a child over the age of thirteen must be conducted
by a caseworker of the same sex; and (3) a severely ill child should
immediately be seen by a physician.149
federal statutes regarding child welfare, however the history and extent of these federal
statues are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a full discussion, see Id. at exhibits 3.1
and 3.2.
145
See supra note 136.
146
See supra notes 132, 133.
147
Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 895–96 (7th Cir. 1986).
148
Id. at 896.
149
Id.

2021]

Comment: Doe v. Woodard

127

This list is helpful because it is concise, thorough, and easy to
understand. These requirements protect the privacy interests of the child
by often requiring the caretaker to be present and consent to the search.
Additionally, this list pushes for a physician to conduct the search. This
is an important safeguard because a caseworker has little, if any, medical
training, whereas medical professionals are trained in examining bodies
and can form a medical diagnosis. Further, even young children
understand doctors are one of the few people who are allowed to undress
and inspect their body;150 therefore, the search is done in a more private
and comfortable environment.
While this list creates a strong starting point for proposed
legislation, it could be modified. There could be a “step zero” where
caseworkers must substantially verify the report of abuse or neglect
before conducting a search. This preliminary investigation would require
weighing the credibility of the source before taking action. Practically,
this may require calling the child’s parents or talking to the child’s
siblings, teachers, or friends to determine whether the allegation is
supported by some evidence before diving into a full-scale search and
investigation.151 While this does take time and resources, this additional
safeguard is necessary to prevent unsubstantiated searches from taking
place. Further, this information can be used to show probable cause when
obtaining a warrant.
Part of this “step zero” preliminary investigation should also
require children to be briefly interviewed before a physical examination
takes place. This would allow the child an opportunity to explain if they
were being abused and direct the caseworker to specific parts of their
body where they have been hurt. This could lead to a more limited and
targeted search rather than asking the child to completely undress.
Additionally, this opens a dialogue with the child where the caseworker
could explain the search, why it is happening, and attempt to ease the
mind of the child.
Finally, there should be more emphasis on the age of the child. For
example, any child over the age of five (kindergarten-aged and above)
should only be inspected by a person of the same sex, unless that person
is a medical professional. School-aged children have a sense of personal
autonomy and privacy over their bodies.152 Additionally, when
150

10 Ways to Teach Your Child the Skills to Prevent Child Abuse, FAM. & CHILD.
SERV. (last visited Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.fcsok.org/10-ways-to-teach-your-childthe-skills-to-prevent-sexual-abuse/ (parents should explain to children that mommy and
daddy and the doctor can see the child naked, but not anyone else outside the home).
151
See supra note 135.
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See supra notes 132-133.

128

CHILD AND FAMILY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:1

determining if a search is reasonable, courts look to whether the search
was appropriate in light of the age and sex of the child.153 Once the
above guidelines have been met, and a body examination is warranted,
this would be one additional safeguard to protect the privacy interests of
children who are subjected to a visual body search.
Below is a proposed statute that encompasses each of these
concerns. This statute could be included in state criminal codes
concerning domestic abuse or sex offenses to outline the rights of the
person being searched and the limits on the caseworker conducting the
search. It could also be published in policy handbooks and manuals for
caseworkers in various state and federal departments who investigate
child abuse.
E. Conducting a Search of a Child who is a Suspected Victim of
Child Abuse—Conditions for Removing Clothing:
A) If a caseworker objectively believes a physical
examination involving the removal of clothing of a
minor is necessary to search the child’s body for indicia
of abuse, the caseworker must:
1) have a licensed medical professional conduct
the examination;154
2) require a caretaker, not alleged of abuse, to
take the child to a physician for an
examination;155
i. a caretaker could include any adult
family member or guardian, or
ii. an adult of the child’s designation
with whom they feel comfortable
3) conduct the examination with a caretaker not
alleged of abuse present;156 or
i. if conducted by a caseworker, the
caseworker must identify as the same
gender as the child to conduct the
search if the child is five years old or
older.157

153

N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
See supra notes 148–49 (citing Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., Child Abuse and
Neglect Investigation Decisions Handbook 66 (1982)).
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See supra notes 135, 150.
156
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4) permit the school nurse to perform the
examination without others present unless the
child so requests.158
B) If the caseworker has reason to believe the child is a
victim of sexual assault, the physical examination
must:
1) be conducted by a licensed medical
professional;159 or
2) be conducted by a school nurse without others
present unless the child so requests.160
C) Before an examination described in section A or B can
take place, the caseworker must:
3) take appropriate steps to verify the report of
abuse or neglect to determine whether,
objectively, the test is necessary. Appropriate
steps may include, but are not limited to:
i. determining the identity of the person
who provided the tip;
ii. evaluating the credibility of the person
who provided the tip;
iii. speaking to the child’s teacher;
iv. speaking to the child’s friends; or
v. speaking to the child’s family
members who are not alleged abusers
4) speak with the child and ask them specifically
about the allegations raised, including but not
limited to:
i. asking the child if they have been
touched inappropriately;
ii. asking the child to indicate where
they have been touched or where their
body hurts to target specific areas to
search; and
iii. explain the reasons for the search,
who will conduct the search, and why
the search is taking place.

In sum, the privacy interests of children will be best protected if the
special needs doctrine is inapplicable to searches of suspected victims of
child abuse. This would require caseworkers to obtain a warrant unless
they have received parental consent or are operating under an exigent
158
159
160

See supra note 150.
See supra note 150.
See supra note 150.
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circumstance. Once this hurdle has been passed to allow for a search, a
clear, brief, and thorough list of guidelines for caseworkers can help
protect the privacy interests of the child. By adopting more
straightforward guidelines, it creates “clearly established” law. Clearly
established law can prevent caseworkers from being shielded by
qualified immunity because if their actions objectively violate clearly
established law, they will be held responsible. Additionally, by clarifying
the law and proposing this more straightforward legislation, it could help
end the uncertainty perpetuating this circuit split.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit was correct in holding that qualified immunity
applied because the law was not clearly defined. However, the Tenth
Circuit should follow the growing trend in the circuit split to prevent the
special needs doctrine from applying to searches of suspected victims of
child abuse. The law should not allow the special needs doctrine to apply
because the tests and applications are too vague to produce consistent
results, the consequences of these searches can be severe so full due
process should be warranted, and the doctrine could be abused. Further,
the law should be clarified to prevent the special needs doctrine from
being applied, and guidelines for caseworkers need to be more
straightforward to sufficiently clarify the law. Doing so will best protect
the privacy interests of suspected victims of child abuse.

